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ABSTRACT
The growing availability of genomic data is unlocking research
potentials on genomic-data analysis. It is of great importance to
outsource the genomic-analysis tasks onto clouds to leverage their
powerful computational resources over the large-scale genomic se-
quences. However, the remote placement of the data raises personal-
privacy concerns, and it is challenging to evaluate data-analysis
functions on outsourced genomic data securely and efficiently. In
this work, we study the secure similar-sequence-query (SSQ) prob-
lem over outsourced genomic data, which has not been fully in-
vestigated. To address the challenges of security and efficiency,
we propose two protocols in the mixed form, which combine two-
party secure secret sharing, garbled circuit, and partial homomor-
phic encryptions together and use them to jointly fulfill the secure
SSQ function. In addition, our protocols support multi-user queries
over a joint genomic data set collected from multiple data owners,
making our solution scalable. We formally prove the security of
protocols under the semi-honest adversary model, and theoreti-
cally analyze the performance. We use extensive experiments over
real-world dataset on a commercial cloud platform to validate the
efficacy of our proposed solution, and demonstrate the performance
improvements compared with state-of-the-art works.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The rapid advance of the gene-sequencing technique is generating
a huge amount of genomic data which holds the key to the under-
standing of many diseases. The cost of sequencing a human genome
is about $1,000 today and is estimated to drop to only $100 in near
future with the aid of next-generation sequencing techniques [1].
The growing availability of genomic data is unlocking research po-
tentials on genome-data query and analysis [21] in medical domain.
Similar Sequence Query (SSQ) on genomic data has been utilized
as a cornerstone in many gene therapies to identify individuals
with close genomic data. Among the indicators of genomic simi-
larity, edit distance is regarded as one of the most important and
frequently-used metrics for biomedical research [29].
However, genomic information is highly sensitive, thusmalicious
analysis over genomic data could lead to terrifying privacy leakage.
It has been reported that researchers could identify a patient by
analyzing his/her genome sequence [32], or infer the close relatives
given a target person’s gene sequence [19]. To address the privacy
issues, several works have been proposed to securely perform SSQ
operations on genomic data. Researchers used the secure multi-
party computation model (SMC) to perform a query operation
over the genomic data set without revealing the query information
[2, 3, 35, 36]. However, these works produce a large amount of user-
side computations and communications, which are too unwieldy
to be practical.
To free users from these burdens, another paradigm that is based
on secure computing outsourcing is investigated. In this paradigm,
the data owner securely outsources data to the cloud server, which
will then process user’s queries by searching within the data set in
a privacy-preserving manner. Several privacy-preserving protocols
[5, 9, 14] are proposed to compute the edit distance between two
sequences based on homomorphic encryptions. Though correct-
ness demonstrated, these approaches raise performance concerns
primarily due to the length of genomic sequences.
To address this issue, in a recent piece of work [23], Kim et
al. developed a secure approximate edit distance scheme aiming
at reducing the computation overhead on cloud based on the set-
difference metric, which enables parallel processing in computation.
However, the query user still suffers from heavy overhead. In ad-
dition, all these works heavily rely on homomorphic encryption
primitives, which are costly to make these schemes scalable to
support multiple data owners and users.
In this work, we study the secure similar sequence query prob-
lem over outsourced genomic data. Our goal is to develop a secure
SSQ solution that is efficient over large-volume genomic data. To
this end, we propose two protocols in the mixed form [12], which
combine two-party secret sharing, garbled circuit, and partial ho-
momorphic encryptions together and use them to jointly fulfill the
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secure SSQ function. Our protocols could perform k-nearest se-
quence queries securely by guaranteeing the privacy of outsourced
data and queries. To improve our protocols’ performance, we em-
ploy the lightweight additive secret sharing method to evaluate
the majority of secure-computation functions, while reducing the
usage of homomorphic encryptions to the minimum. The computa-
tional overhead on query users is negligible and the communication
overhead is only one-time. In addition, our protocols support mul-
tiple query-generating users and data owners, yielding a scalable
solution in advancing secure SSQ in practice.
Challenges.We observe that finding the minimum and selecting
the branch are key operations in the process of edit distance com-
putation. During these processes, the information regarding the
index of the result should not be revealed, because some confi-
dential information, such as the access patterns could be leaked
with indices disclosed. Although there are some works tackling
these problems, their performance is not satisfactory, since multiple
costly encryptions, decryptions, and evaluations on ciphertexts are
needed [10, 13]. Also, their schemes didn’t consider the scalability
issue in multi-user scenarios.
In addition, our mixed protocols utilize different types of sub-
protocols, which use different message spaces. For example, in the
offline phase of our secure shuffling protocol, a conversion from
message space of additive secret sharing to that of Paillier encryp-
tion is needed. Though straightforward to convert the message
space while guaranteeing the correctness of protocols in evaluating
corresponding functions, it is challenging to guarantee security
during this process.
Our Contribution. By addressing the aforementioned challenges,
we propose two protocols that could securely and efficiently com-
pute k nearest sequences given queries from multiple users. Specif-
ically, our contributions are:
• In combination with multiple secure computation methods
including secret sharing, garbled circuits, and homomorphic
encryption, we present a set of secure hybrid sub-protocols,
which can be used as building blocks for secure similar se-
quence query.
• Based on our building blocks, we implement two secure SSQ
protocols with exact edit distance (SSQ-I) and approximate
edit distance (SSQ-II). Our protocols allow secure multi-user
SSQ on a joint genomic database collected from different data
sources. By shifting a large portion of computational work-
load including the homomorphic encryptions to the offline
phase, we could remarkably improve the query performance.
• We formally prove that our protocols are secure under semi-
honest adversaries model. We present an extensive experi-
mental evaluation of the proposed protocols that are imple-
mented on a commercial cloud platform, showing that the
proposed methods scale well for large data sets, and clearly
outperform state-of-the-art works.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
edit distance computation and some secure computation primitives.
Section 3 gives an overview of our system framework. A set of
privacy-preserving sub-protocols and their implementations are
provided in Section 4. In Section 5, the two proposed SSQ protocols
are explained in detail. We analyze the computational complexity
and the security of the proposed protocols in Section 6. The pro-
posed protocols are evaluated through extensive simulations in
Section 7. We make a discussion and review some related work in
Section 8 and Section 9, and make a conclusion in Section 10.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Edit Distance Protocol for Genomic
Sequences
Edit distance is a measure to quantify how dissimilar two strings of
characters are to one another by counting the minimum number of
edits required to transform one string into the other. Wagner-Fisher
algorithm is a common method for computing edit distance based
on dynamic programming, we refer the reader to Appendix A for
details.
However, the overhead for computing the exact genome edit
distance in a privacy-preserving manner is too large because of
large datasets and long sequences. There is a unique feature in
human genome sequences that two average human individuals
are extremely similar at the genetic level (about 99.5%) [36]. So
researchers, in recent years, have developed a series of approximate
edit distance protocols based on this observation [3, 23, 36]. Next,
we briefly describe an advanced approximate algorithm1 [3].
First, the algorithm converts the edit-distance function (ED)
into a block-wise approximation. Each sequence Si in the data-
base and query Q are broken into t short length (less than 15)
blocks (Si,1, . . . , Si,t ) and (Q1, . . . ,Qt ). Then the approximate edit-
distance between Si and Q can be computed as follows:
ApproxED(Q, Si ) ≈
t∑
l=1
ED(Ql , Si,l ). (1)
For genomic data, since each block has only a few distinct values, the
size of the set of values Tl = {Si,l : i = 1, . . . ,m} is much smaller
thanm. Furthermore, there is a high probability that the blockQl is
in the set Tl . Let v =max(|Tl | : l = 1, . . . , t), Tl = {ul,1, . . . ,ul,v },
define a bit variable χl, j ← (ul, j == Ql ?1 : 0) to indicate whether
ul, j is equal to Ql . In the case where Ql  Tl , χl, j = 0 will bring
the error. However, [3] verified that the error rate is minor on real
genomic data. Thus, we have
ED(Ql , Si,l ) ≈
v∑
j=1
χl, j · ED(ul, j , Si,l ), (2)
then
ApproxED(Q, Si ) ≈
t∑
l=1
v∑
j=1
χl, j · ED(ul, j , Si,l ). (3)
Note that ED(ul, j , Si,l ) is not relevant to the query Q , so it can be
pre-computed.
2.2 Secure Computation
2.2.1 Additive Secret Sharing and Multiplication Triplets. For the
additive secret sharing [12], an -bit value x is shared additively
in the ring Z2 as the sum of two values. For an -bit additive
secret sharing 〈x〉 of x , we have 〈x〉A + 〈x〉B ≡ x (mod 2 ) where
〈x〉A , 〈x〉B ∈ Z2 and 〈x〉
α is only known by partyα (α ∈ {A,B}).
We denote a shared value x as 〈x〉. To recover (Rec(·, ·)) the value
1This work won the 1st place for accuracy and speed in the recent iDASH competition
(http://www.humangenomeprivacy.org/2016/).
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x , party A (B) sends 〈x〉A (〈x〉B ) to party B (A) who computes
x = 〈x〉A + 〈x〉B . The basic operation on additive secret sharing
values can be defined as follows:
Addition. To compute the sum of two shared values 〈x〉 and
〈y〉, 〈z〉 = 〈x + y〉 = 〈x〉 + 〈y〉 can be defined as: party α locally
computes 〈z〉α = 〈x〉α + 〈y〉α . To compute the sum of a shared
values 〈x〉 and a public constant c , 〈z〉 = 〈x + c〉 = 〈x〉 + c can be
defined as: party A locally computes 〈z〉A = 〈x〉A + c , party B
locally computes 〈z〉B = 〈x〉B .
Multiplication. 〈z〉 = 〈x〉 · 〈y〉: In order to perform multipli-
cation, we take advantage of pre-computed multiplication triplets
[4, 12] of the form 〈c〉 = 〈a〉 · 〈b〉: party α locally computes 〈e〉α =
〈x〉α − 〈a〉α and 〈f 〉α = 〈y〉α − 〈b〉α . Both parties run e=Rec(〈e〉A ,
〈e〉B ) and f =Rec(〈f 〉A ,〈f 〉B ), then partyA sets 〈z〉A = f · 〈a〉A+
e · 〈b〉A + 〈c〉A and B sets 〈z〉B = e · f + f · 〈a〉B +e · 〈b〉B + 〈c〉B .
In the remainder of this paper, the additive secret sharing is
abbreviated as secret sharing or sharing for brevity.
2.2.2 Yao’s Garbled Circuits. Yao’s garbled circuits allow two
parties holding inputs x and y, respectively, to evaluate an arbitrary
function f (x ,y)without leaking any information about their inputs
beyond what is implied by the function output [25]. Three simple
circuits will be used in this paper to construct secure protocols. An
ADD circuit takes two integers x and y as inputs and outputs an
integer z, such that z = x +y. A CMP circuit takes x and y as input,
and outputs 1 if x > y and 0 otherwise. An EQ circuit takes x and
y as input, and outputs 1 if x == y and 0 otherwise.
2.2.3 Paillier Cryptosystem with Distributed Decryption. Paillier
cryptosystem was first proposed by [31], which is an additive ho-
momorphic encryption scheme. Hazay et al. adapted the Paillier
cryptosystem to separate private key sk into two shares sk(1), sk(2)
to support distributed decryption [17]. Let Epk (·) and Dsk (·) be the
encryption and decryption function, where public key pk is given
by (N ,д) and N is a product of two large primes and д is in Z∗
N 2
.
Also, let PDecsk (1) (·), PDecsk (2) (·) be the partial decryption function
with partial private key sk(1), sk(2). Given a,b ∈ ZN , the Paillier
cryptosystem with distributed decryption exhibits the following
properties:
Distributed Decryption2: a′ ← PDecsk (1) (Epk (a)) and a ←
PDecsk (2) (a
′).
HomomorphicAddition:Dsk (Epk (a)·Epk (b) mod N
2)= (a+
b) mod N , Dsk (Epk (a)
b mod N 2) = a · b mod N .
3 PROBLEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we formalize the system model, outline the prob-
lem statement, and describe the security model. For references, a
summary of notations is given in Table 1.
3.1 System Model
As shown in Figure 1, our systemmodel involves two non-colluding
servers, multiple data owners and a set of query users.
(1) Two-Servers:We consider the existence of two non-colluding
cloud servers, denoted by Server A and Server B. Both
servers have the ability to maintain a database contributed by
2The original work presents this process in a different and general form.
Table 1: The Summary of Notations
Notations Definitions
〈x〉
a pair of secret shares of the value x
i.e., (〈x〉A , 〈x〉B)
〈x〉A /〈x〉B the share of x stored in A or B
pk public key in Paillier
sk(1)/sk(2) partial private keys in Paillier
[x]pk Encrypted data x under pk
PDecsk (i ) (·) Partial decryption with sk
(i), i = 1/2
??? ?????????????
???
???
???
????????? ?????
?????
??????????????
??????
???????
?????????
?
?
Figure 1: System Model.
multiple data owners. The two servers cooperate to answer
queries from multiple query users in a privacy-preserving
manner.
(2) Data owners: Data are generated or collected by multiple
data owners, they would upload the secret sharing data to
Server A and Server B.
(3) Query users: The goal of query users is to request the two-
servers to perform some queries over the secret sharing
data. After the queries has been performed, the result can
be obtained by the requesting users.
Note that we use the two-server architecture which has been widely
used in recent works [11, 13, 26, 28]. We don’t use the single-server
model due to its difficulty in fulfilling various computation opera-
tions in our system while achieving good efficiency and security
performances simultaneously.
3.2 Problem Statement
In this part, we first describe how to encode the genomic sequence
in our system and then present the problem statement.
Since genomic sequences are represented by the four letter al-
phabet of nucleotides {A, C, G, T}, each letter can be represented
as an integer and each genomic sequence can be represented as
an integer vector. For instance, we can use the integers 0,1,2,3 to
represent A,C,G,T, then the sequence "ATCGC" can be expressed
as [0,3,1,2,1]. Actually, in our scheme, any arbitrary integer works
without influencing the correctness of the result, but thereafter we
will use the above encoding scheme for uniformity and the genomic
sequences in the remainder of this paper refer to encoded genomic
sequences.
We consider w data owners DO1, · · · ,DOw (e.g. hospitals, re-
search institutions) who agree to construct a joint genomic database
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D based on the sequences they possess. For reasons of privacy, each
sequence Si is divided into two shares 〈Si 〉
A and 〈Si 〉
B locally
using additive secret sharing, and then each data owner sends the
two shares to serverA and server B, respectively. Consider a query
user (e.g. physician) who wants to query the top-k similar genomic
sequences corresponding to query Q . Refer to [3, 36], we use edit
distance as the metric to measure the similarity between different
genomic sequences. In order to preserve the query privacy, the user
uses additive secret sharing to partition the queryQ into two shares
〈Q〉A and 〈Q〉B , then send them to two servers. After receiving
the query request, the two servers run a series of secure protocols
to compute the edit distances and return the indices of top-k results
(i.e., the indices of k-nearest sequences) I = {Ij : 1 ≤ j ≤ k} to the
user without revealing any private information about the genomic
database D and the query Q .
3.3 Security Model
Adversary Model. We consider the problem of secure similar
sequence query under the semi-honest adversary model. That is, we
assume that parties are semi-honest (also referred to as honest-but-
curious) ones who correctly follow the protocol specification, yet
attempt to learn additional information by analyzing the transcript
of messages received during the execution. In addition, our work
also assumes that the two servers do not collude.
Desired Privacy Properties. Recall that our protocols aim to
securely compute edit distance and return the indices of k nearest
neighbors to query users. Our protocols should be secure under the
semi-honest adversaries model. Our query schemes should protect
data privacy, query privacy, and data access patterns. Specially, A
and B should know nothing about the exact data of D except the
database size and sequence length. In addition, A and B should
know nothing about the queryQ except the sequence length. Access
patterns to the data, such as the indices of the top-k query results,
should not be revealed toA andB to prevent any inference attacks.
4 BUILDING BLOCKS
In this section, we present a set of generic sub-protocols that will
be used in constructing our proposed protocols in Section 5. Specif-
ically, we realize the following five functions on secret sharing data:
1) secure shuffling; 2) secure branching; 3) secure minimum com-
puting; 4) secure exact edit distance computing; 5) secure sequence
comparing. These sub-protocols could also be used in other types
of secure computing protocols, e.g., secure k-NN query [13] and
trajectory similarity computing [26]. Recall that we assume the
existence of two semi-honest servers A and B such that the Pail-
lier’s partial private key (introduced in Section 2.2.3) sk(1) is known
only to server A and sk(2) only to server B whereas pk = (N ,д)
is treated as public. In the following protocols, unless explicitly
stated, we assume all operations to be performed are on the ring
Z2 . In the following, we first detail the secure shuffling protocol,
then realize other functions one-by-one.
4.1 Secure Shuffling (SSF) Protocol
Consider an original sequence x=[x1, . . . ,xn ] is additively secret-
shared into two shares 〈x〉A = [〈x1〉
A , . . . , 〈xn〉
A] and 〈x〉B =
[〈x1〉
B , . . . , 〈xn〉
B]. Secure Shuffling (SSF) protocol is to realize
the function that permutes the original sequences 〈x〉A and 〈x〉B
into the new sequences 〈x′〉A and 〈x′〉B . During this protocol, no
information regarding x is revealed to A and B. Inspired by the
previous work [26], we permute the original sequences 〈x〉A =
[〈x1〉
A , . . . , 〈xn〉
A] and 〈x〉B = [〈x1〉
B , . . . , 〈xn〉
B] into the new
sequences 〈x′〉A = [
〈
xπ (π ′(1))
〉A
, . . . ,
〈
xπ (π ′(n))
〉A
] and 〈x′〉B =
[
〈
xπ (π ′(1))
〉B
, . . . ,
〈
xπ (π ′(n))
〉B
] by two random permutation func-
tions π (only hold by A) and π ′ (only hold by B). As long as A
and B do not know each other’s permutation function, neither of
them could recover the original indices of 〈x〉. In consideration of
performance, SSF protocol is divided into two phases: offline and
online. The offline phase generates some common assistant values
which are independent of the input of protocol, while online phase
can achieve the shuffle in a single interaction between A and B
with the help of the assistant values.
Algorithm 1 shows the main steps in the offline phase. Note
that in this phase, the operations are performed on the group ZN .
At the beginning of this protocol, Server A chooses n random
integers u1, . . . ,un ∈ Z2 to form a vector u and chooses n random
integers r1, . . . , rn ∈ {0 · 2
 , · · · , (K − 2) · 2}(K =
⌊
N /2
⌋
) to form
a vector r. In this step, we make a conversion frommessage space of
additive secret sharing to that of Paillier encryption by introducing a
group of random values of ri . Then,A constructs a sequence L0 ←
[Epk (u1+r1), . . . ,Epk (un+rn )]whereui +ri is encrypted under the
public keypk , and send it toB. Thanks to the property of distributed
decryption in the improved Paillier cryptosystem [17], B is unable
to decrypt L0 without the help ofA. Upon receiving L0,B generates
a random vector v= [v1, . . . ,vn ](vi ∈ Z2 ) and randomizes L0 by
v for obtaining L1 ← [Epk (u1 + v1 + r1), . . . ,Epk (un + vn + rn )].
After that, B permutes L1 using a random permutation function
π ′ and send it to A. Similarly, a random permutation function
π is selected by A to permute L1. Then, A uses partial private
key sk(1) to partially decrypt L1 and sends the partial ciphertext
L2 to B. Finally, B decrypts L2 by sk
(2) to get L3 = [uπ (π ′(1)) +
vπ (π ′(1)) + rπ (π ′(1)), . . . ,uπ (π ′(n)) +vπ (π ′(n)) + rπ (π ′(n))], and then
eliminates rπ (π ′(i)) bymodulus operations for getting 〈x
′〉B = −(L3
mod 2) = [−uπ (π ′(1)) −vπ (π ′(1)), . . . ,−uπ (π ′(n)) −vπ (π ′(n))].
Next, we describe how to implement the online phase of SSF
protocol in the Algorithm 2. The input in this phase is a secret
sharing sequence 〈x〉 i.e., A inputs 〈x〉A = [〈x1〉
A , · · · , 〈xn〉
A]
and B inputs 〈x〉B = [〈x1〉
B , · · · , 〈xn〉
B]. Note that at this point,
A holds π , u and B holds π ′, v, where u, v are the assistant val-
ues. To start with, A additively masks each 〈xi 〉
A with ui and
assembles them in the sequence L4, such that L4 ← [〈x1〉
A +
u1, . . . , 〈xn〉
A + un ]. This prevents B from learning 〈xi 〉
A . Af-
ter receiving L4, B accumulates L4, 〈x〉
B , v in an element-wise
manner to get L5 = [x1 + u1 + v1, . . . ,xn + un + vn ]. Then, L5 is
permuted by π ′ and sent back toA. Finally,A uses π to permutate
L5 again. So the protocol ends withA holding 〈x
′〉A = [xπ (π ′(1))+
uπ (π ′(1))+vπ (π ′(1)), . . . ,xπ (π ′(n))+uπ (π ′(n))+vπ (π ′(n))] andB hold-
ing 〈x′〉B = [−uπ (π ′(1)) −vπ (π ′(1)), . . . , −uπ (π ′(n)) −vπ (π ′(n))], i.e.,
the permuted sequence 〈x′〉.
We should note that the performance of our protocol in the offline
phase can be improved by a universal data packing technology, we
refer the reader to [6] for details. As for the online part, our protocol
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at ASIACCS '18:
Proceedings of the 2018 on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, published by Association for Computing Machinery. Copyright
restrictions may apply. doi: 10.1145/3196494.3196535
Algorithm 1 The Offline Phase of Secure Shuffling Protocol
Input: None (A holds pk, sk(1); B holds pk, sk(2))
Output: B outputs 〈x′〉B = [
〈
x ′1
〉B
, · · · ,
〈
x ′n
〉B
]
1: A:
2: Pick n random integers u1, . . . , un ∈ Z2 , u =[u1, . . . , un ]
3: Pick n random integers r1, . . . , rn ∈ {0 · 2
, 1 · 2, · · · ,
(K − 2) · 2 }(K =
⌊
N /2
⌋
), r =[r1, . . . , rn ]
4: L0 ← [Epk (u1 + r1), . . . , Epk (un + rn )]
5: Send L0 to B
6: B:
7: Receive L0 from A
8: Pick n random integers v1, . . . , vn ∈ Z2
9: v =[v1, . . . , vn ]
10: L1 ← [Epk (u1 + r1) · Epk (v1), . . . , Epk (un + rn ) · Epk (vn )]
= [Epk (u1 + v1 + r1), . . . , Epk (un + vn + rn )]
11: Generate a random π ′, then permute L1 by π
′:
L1 ← [Epk (uπ ′(1) + vπ ′(1) + rπ ′(1)), . . . ,
Epk (uπ ′(n) + vπ ′(n) + rπ ′(n))]
12: Send L1 to A
13: A:
14: Receive L1 from B
15: Generate a random π , then permute L1 by π :
L1 ← [Epk (uπ (π ′(1)) + vπ (π ′(1)) + rπ (π ′(1))), . . . ,
Epk (uπ (π ′(n)) + vπ (π ′(n)) + rπ (π ′(n)))]
16: Partial decrypt L1 with PDecsk (1) (·) to obtain L2
17: Send L2 to B
18: B:
19: Receive L2 from A
20: Decrypt L2 with PDecsk (2) (·) to obtain:
L3 ← [uπ (π ′(1)) + vπ (π ′(1)) + rπ (π ′(1)), · · · , uπ (π ′(n))+
vπ (π ′(n)) + rπ (π ′(n))]
21: 〈x′ 〉B ← [
〈
x ′1
〉B
, · · · ,
〈
x ′n
〉B
] = −(L3 mod 2
 )
= [−uπ (π ′(1)) − vπ (π ′(1)), . . . , −uπ (π ′(n)) − vπ (π ′(n))]
enjoys excellent performance since it only requires one interaction
and involves no cryptographic operation.
4.2 Secure Branching (SBC) Protocol
We assume that A inputs a set of shared values 〈x1〉
A , 〈x2〉
A ,
〈y1〉
A , 〈y2〉
A and B inputs another part 〈x1〉
B , 〈x2〉
B , 〈y1〉
B ,
〈y2〉
B . Secure Branching (SBC) protocol is to realize the function
that securely executes the following conditional statement on secret
sharing data:
if(x1 > x2) then y ← y1 else y ← y2.
The output of the protocol is in the form of secret sharing, i.e.,
A outputs 〈y〉A and B outputs 〈y〉B . During this process, no
information regarding x1,x2,y1, and y2 is revealed to Server A
and Server B. Here, we construct an efficient mixed SBC proto-
col based on the SSF protocol. The main steps involved in SBC
protocol are shown in Algorithm 3. By the SSF protocol, Server
A and Server B jointly use the permutation function π (π ′(·))
to shuffle the secret sharing sequences [〈x1〉 , 〈x2〉] to get a new
one [
〈
xπ (π ′(1))
〉
,
〈
xπ (π ′(2))
〉
]. Then, the same permutation func-
tion π (π ′(·)) is applied to [〈y1〉 , 〈y2〉] for obtaining [
〈
yπ (π ′(1))
〉
,〈
yπ (π ′(2))
〉
]. After shuffling, a ADD-CMP circuit is used to com-
pare
〈
xπ (π ′(1))
〉
and
〈
xπ (π ′(2))
〉
. As depicted in Figure 2(a), the
anatomy of ADD-CMP is very simple as it only consists of two ADD
Algorithm 2 The Online Phase of Secure Shuffling Protocol
Input: A inputs 〈x〉A = [〈x1〉
A , · · · , 〈xn〉
A](A holds π , u)
B inputs 〈x〉B = [〈x1〉
B , · · · , 〈xn〉
B] (B holds π ′, v)
Output: A outputs 〈x′〉A = [
〈
x ′1
〉A
, · · · ,
〈
x ′n
〉A
]
1: A:
2: L4 ← [〈x1〉
A , . . . , 〈xn〉
A]
3: Mask L4 by u to get:
L4 ← [〈x1〉
A + u1, . . . , 〈xn〉
A + un ]
4: Send L4 to B
5: B:
6: Receive L4 from A
7: Compute L5 ← L4 + 〈x〉
B + v to get
L5 = [x1 + u1 +v1, . . . ,xn + un +vn ]
8: Permute L5 by π
′:
L5 ← [xπ ′(1) + uπ ′(1) + vπ ′(1), . . . , xπ ′(n) + uπ ′(n) + vπ ′(n)]
9: Send L5 to A
10: A:
11: Receive L5 from B
12: Permute L5 by π to obtain
〈x′〉A = [
〈
x ′1
〉A
, · · · ,
〈
x ′n
〉A
] = [xπ (π ′(1)) + uπ (π ′(1)) +
vπ (π ′(1)), . . . ,xπ (π ′(n)) + uπ (π ′(n)) +vπ (π ′(n))]
circuits and a CMP circuit. One ADD circuit takes
〈
xπ (π ′(1))
〉A
and
〈
xπ (π ′(1))
〉B
as inputs while the other takes
〈
xπ (π ′(2))
〉A
and〈
xπ (π ′(2))
〉B
as inputs, then the two outputs serve as the inputs of
the CMP circuit. In this way, ADD-CMP outputs 1 if xπ (π ′(1)) >
xπ (π ′(2)) and 0 otherwise. Specifically, the circuit evaluator runs
oblivious transfer (OT) protocol with the circuit constructor to obliv-
iously obtain the garbled input corresponding to its private input,
then evaluates the garbled circuit to get the final result. If the result
is public, the evaluator directly sends it to the constructor. Note
that in this protocol,A or B can be either the circuit constructor or
the circuit evaluator and the output θ is public to A and B. Finally,
based on the output of theADD-CMP circuit, ServerA and ServerB
separately determine the final values 〈y〉A and 〈y〉B , i.e., if θ == 1
then 〈y〉α ←
〈
yπ (π ′(1))
〉α
else 〈y〉α ←
〈
yπ (π ′(2))
〉α
(α ∈ {A,B}).
???
???
??? ???
(a) ADD-CMP
??
???
(b) EQ-ADD
Figure 2: The structure of circuits
4.3 Secure Minimum Selection (SMS) Protocol
Let us assume that A inputs 〈x〉A = [〈x1〉
A , . . . , 〈xn〉
A] and
B inputs 〈x〉B = [〈x1〉
B , . . . , 〈xn〉
B]. Secure Minimum Selection
(SMS) protocol is to realize the function that A outputs 〈xmin〉
A
and B outputs 〈xmin〉
B , where xmin = min(x1, · · · ,xn ). In the
process, no information regarding the values of x = [x1, · · · ,xn ] is
revealed to A and B. Here, we construct an efficient mixed SMS
protocol based on the SSF protocol. The main steps involved in the
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Algorithm 3 Secure Branching Protocol
Input: A inputs [〈x1〉
A , 〈x2〉
A], [〈y1〉
A , 〈y2〉
A];
B inputs [〈x1〉
B , 〈x2〉
B], [〈y1〉
B , 〈y2〉
B];
Output: A outputs 〈y〉A ; B outputs 〈y〉B
1: A and B:
2: [
〈
xπ (π ′(1))
〉
,
〈
xπ (π ′(2))
〉
] ← SSF([〈x1〉 , 〈x2〉])
3: [
〈
yπ (π ′(1))
〉
,
〈
yπ (π ′(2))
〉
] ← SSF([〈y1〉 , 〈y2〉])
4: θ ← ADD-CMP(
〈
xπ (π ′(1))
〉
,
〈
xπ (π ′(2))
〉
)
5: if θ == 1 then
6: A: 〈y〉A ←
〈
yπ (π ′(1))
〉A
; B: 〈y〉B ←
〈
yπ (π ′(1))
〉B
7: else
8: A: 〈y〉A ←
〈
yπ (π ′(2))
〉A
; B: 〈y〉B ←
〈
yπ (π ′(2))
〉B
Algorithm 4 Secure Minimum Selection Protocol
Input: A inputs 〈x〉A= [〈x1〉
A , · · · , 〈xn〉
A]
B inputs 〈x〉B= [〈x1〉
B , · · · , 〈xn〉
B]
Output: A outputs 〈xmin〉
A ; B outputs 〈xmin〉
B
1: A and B:
2: 〈x′〉 ← SSF(〈x〉) = [
〈
xπ (π ′(1))
〉
, · · · ,
〈
xπ (π ′(n))
〉
]
3: A: 〈xδ 〉
A ←
〈
xπ (π ′(1))
〉A
4: B: 〈xδ 〉
B ←
〈
xπ (π ′(1))
〉B
5: for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 do
6: A and B: θ ← ADD-CMP(〈xδ 〉 ,
〈
xπ (π ′(i+1))
〉
)
7: if θ == 1 then
8: A: 〈xδ 〉
A ←
〈
xπ (π ′(i+1))
〉A
9: B: 〈xδ 〉
B ←
〈
xπ (π ′(i+1))
〉B
10: A: 〈xmin〉
A ← 〈xδ 〉
A
11: B: 〈xmin〉
B ← 〈xδ 〉
B
SMS protocol are shown in Algorithm 4. Initially, we utilize SSF
protocol to permutate the original sequence to get the new one 〈x′〉.
After shuffling, A or B prepares a garbled circuit ADD-CMP for
comparing two additively secret sharing values, e.g. 〈x1〉 and 〈x2〉.
Clearly, the ADD-CMP circuit outputs 1 if x1 > x2 and 0 otherwise.
Same as above, the output of this circuit is public in this protocol.
By calling ADD-CMP n − 1 times, we are able to get the minimum
〈xδ 〉. At the end, the output of SMS is 〈xmin〉
A ← 〈xδ 〉
A and
〈xmin〉
B ← 〈xδ 〉
B . In this protocol, the index δ does not reveal
any information regarding the position of the minimum in the
original sequence to A and B as the sequence has been shuffled
securely.
4.4 Secure Exact Edit Distance Computation
(SEED) Protocol
We assume that A and B input two secret sharing sequences
〈x〉 = [〈x1〉 , · · · ,
〈
xn1
〉
] and 〈y〉 = [〈y1〉 , · · · ,
〈
yn2
〉
], i.e., A in-
puts 〈x〉A and 〈y〉A while B inputs 〈x〉B and 〈y〉B . Secure Exact
Edit Distance (SEED) protocol is to realize the function that com-
putes exact edit distance 〈dED 〉 (in the secret sharing form) between
x and ywithout revealing any private information about them. Now,
we explain how to run Wagner-Fisher algorithm (see Algorithm
9) for edit distance computation in a privacy-preserving manner.
Algorithm 5 Secure Exact Edit Distance Protocol
Input: A inputs 〈x〉A= [〈x1〉
A , · · · ,
〈
xn1
〉A
] and
〈y〉A=[〈y1〉
A , · · · ,
〈
yn2
〉A
]
B inputs 〈x〉B= [〈x1〉
B , · · · ,
〈
xn1
〉B
] and
〈y〉B=[〈y1〉
B , · · · ,
〈
yn2
〉B
]
Output: A outputs 〈dED 〉
A ; B outputs 〈dED 〉
B
1: for 0 ≤ i ≤ n1 do
2: A:
〈
di,0
〉A
← i; B:
〈
di,0
〉B
← 0
3: for 0 ≤ j ≤ n2 do
4: A:
〈
d0, j
〉A
← j; B:
〈
d0, j
〉B
← 0
5: A:
6: 〈cdel 〉
A ← 1, 〈cins 〉
A ← 1, 〈z0〉
A ← 0, 〈z1〉
A ← 1
7: B:
8: 〈cdel 〉
B ← 0, 〈cins 〉
B ← 0, 〈z0〉
B ← 0, 〈z1〉
B ← 0
9: for 1 ≤ i ≤ n1, 1 ≤ j ≤ n2 do
10: A: 〈t1〉
A ← 〈yi 〉
A + 1, 〈t2〉
A ← 〈yi 〉
A − 1
11: B: 〈t1〉
B ← 〈yi 〉
B , 〈t2〉
B ← 〈yi 〉
B
12: A and B:
13: 〈t3〉 ← SBC(〈t1〉 , 〈xi 〉 , 〈z0〉 , 〈z1〉)
14: 〈csub 〉 ← SBC(〈xi 〉 , 〈t2〉 , 〈t3〉 , 〈z1〉)
15:
〈
di, j
〉
← SMS(
〈
di−1, j
〉
+ 〈cdel 〉 ,
〈
di, j−1
〉
+
〈cins 〉 ,
〈
di−1, j−1
〉
+ 〈csub 〉)
16: A: 〈dED 〉
A ←
〈
dn1,n2
〉A
17: B: 〈dED 〉
B ←
〈
dn1,n2
〉B
The main steps are shown in Algorithm 5. To start with, server
A and server B initialize
〈
di,0
〉
(0 ≤ i ≤ n1),
〈
d0, j
〉
(0 ≤ j ≤ n2),
〈cins 〉 and 〈cdel 〉 corresponding to line 1 − 8 in Algorithm 5. Then,
we begin to calculate di, j (1 ≤ i ≤ n1, 1 ≤ j ≤ n2) through itera-
tive computing. Note that 2 should be larger than max(n1,n2) to
guarantee the correctness of edit distance computation while  is
the bit length of data. In each iteration, 〈csub 〉 is assigned to 0 or 1
according to whether xi is equal to yj , i.e., csub ← (xi == yj )?0 : 1.
In order to have an assignment of 〈csub 〉 without revealing in-
formation regarding xi and yj , we first convert “==” operator to
“>”operator as follows:
csub ← (xi == yj )?0 : 1 ⇔
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
t1 ← yj + 1
t2 ← yj − 1
t3 ← (t1 > xi )?0 : 1
csub ← (xi > t2)?t3 : 1
then utilize SBC protocol to perform a secure assignment that cor-
responds to line 12 − 15 in Algorithm 5. Note that, the addition in
line 15 of Algorithm 5 refers to the addition in the form of additive
secret sharing as described in Section 2.2. At the end of each itera-
tion,
〈
di, j
〉
can be calculated by SMS protocol. With n1n2 iterations,
SEED protocol would return the final edit distance
〈
dn1,n2
〉
.
4.5 Secure Approximate Genomic Sequence
Comparison (SAGSC) Protocol
Assume that A and B input two secret sharing genomic sequences
〈x〉 = [〈x1〉 , · · · , 〈xn〉] and 〈y〉 = [〈y1〉 , · · · , 〈yn〉], i.e., A inputs
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Algorithm 6 Secure Approximate Genomic Sequence Comparison
Protocol
Input: A inputs 〈x〉A= [〈x1〉
A , · · · , 〈xn〉
A] and
〈y〉A=[〈y1〉
A , · · · , 〈yn〉
A]
B inputs 〈x〉B= [〈x1〉
B , · · · , 〈xn〉
B] and
〈y〉B=[〈y1〉
B , · · · , 〈yn〉
B]
Output: A outputs 〈χ〉A ; B outputs 〈χ〉B
1: A:
2: 〈Sumx 〉
A ← 〈x1〉
A + · · · + 〈xn〉
A
3:
〈
Sumy
〉A
← 〈y1〉
A + · · · + 〈yn〉
A
4: 〈T 〉A ← 〈Sumx 〉
A −
〈
Sumy
〉A
5: Select a random integer r ∈ Z2 , set 〈χ〉
A ← r
6: B:
7: 〈Sumx 〉
B ← 〈x1〉
B + · · · + 〈xn〉
B
8:
〈
Sumy
〉B
← 〈y1〉
B + · · · + 〈yn〉
B
9: 〈T 〉B ←
〈
Sumy
〉B
− 〈Sumx 〉
B
10: A and B:
11: 〈χ〉B ← EQ-ADD(〈T 〉A , 〈T 〉B ,−r )
〈x〉A and 〈y〉A while B inputs 〈x〉B and 〈y〉B . Secure Approxi-
mate Genomic Sequence Comparison (SAGSC) protocol is to realize
the function that outputs an indicator 〈χ〉 where χ = 1 if x is al-
most the same as y and χ = 0 otherwise. During this process, no
information regarding x and y is revealed to A and B. A naive
method of sequence comparison is to do bit-by-bit comparisons,
but generates too much time overhead since a large number of
comparison operations are needed for the long genomic sequences.
This led us to explore an approximate solution for better efficiency.
In this work, we use different specified integers (i.e., 0, 1, 2, 3) to
encode four nucleotides (i.e., A, C, G, T), and we observed that indi-
vidual differences in the human genome sequences are very small.
So we conclude that if the sums of the encodings of genomic se-
quences are equal, they can be regarded as approximately identical
sequences. That is, if the equation
∑n
i=1 xi ==
∑n
i=1 yi holds, then
two sequences 〈x〉 and 〈y〉 are treated as the same. In the secret
sharing form, the above equation can be converted to
n∑
i=1
〈xi 〉
A −
n∑
i=1
〈yi 〉
B ==
n∑
i=1
〈yi 〉
A −
n∑
i=1
〈xi 〉
B .
The overall steps in SAGSC protocol are shown in Algorithm 6.
We achieve the comparison and secret sharing of the result by the
circuit EQ-ADD (as shown in Figure 2(b)) in which A is the circuit
constructor and the output 〈χ〉B is only given to B. We will show
the error rate of our approximate protocol over a real-world dataset
is very small in Section 7.2, and discuss how to further reduce the
error rate in Section 8.1.
5 SECURE SIMILAR SEQUENCE QUERY ON
GENOMIC DATA
With the above building blocks, we are ready to present the detailed
scheme for secure similar sequence query on genomic data. We
first propose a secure scheme based on exact edit distance (denoted
by SSQ-I), and then present our second scheme, a more efficient
solution with the approximate edit distance (denoted by SSQ-II).
5.1 SSQ-I (with the Exact Edit Distance)
Our scheme consists of the following four stages: genomic data
outsourcing, query request issuing, secure query executing and
result recovering.
5.1.1 Stage 1: Genomic Data Outsourcing. In the genomic data
outsourcing stage, multiple data owners first divide the genomic
sequences locally by additive secret sharing, and then upload the
shares to the two servers for constructing a joint databaseD. Specif-
ically, for a sequence S = [S[1], . . . , S[n]] (n denotes the length
of each sequence), a set of random numbers ri ∈ Z2 are chosen,
and then the data owner sets 〈S〉A = [r1, . . . , rn ] and computes
〈S〉B = [S[1] − r1, . . . , S[n] − rn ]. After that, one share 〈S〉
A is
uploaded to ServerA and another share 〈S〉B is uploaded to Server
B. We assume that the above shares are sent over secure chan-
nels. When genomic data outsourcing of multiple owners are com-
pleted, A and B maintain a joint genomic database D in the secret
sharing form. We assume there are a total of m sequences, then
D = (〈S1〉 , · · · , 〈Sm〉).
5.1.2 Stage 2: Query request issuing. Once the joint database D
is set up, similar sequence queries can be issued frommultiple users.
To protect privacy, the user uses additive secret sharing to partition
the queryQ = [Q[1], · · · ,Q[n]] into two shares denoted by 〈Q〉A =
[〈Q[1]〉A , · · · , 〈Q[n]〉A] and 〈Q〉B = [〈Q[1]〉B , · · · , 〈Q[n]〉B],
then send 〈Q〉A and 〈Q〉B to Server A and Server B, respectively.
5.1.3 Stage 3: SecureQuery Executing. When two servers receive
the request from the user, secure query protocol can be executed
between A and B. The goal of the proposed protocol is to retrieve
the indices of the top k (k ≤ m) genomic sequences that are closest
to the user query in a secure manner. The main steps involved in
the secure query protocol are given in Algorithm 7.
First, we use SEED protocol (described in 4.4) directly to compute
exact edit distance between 〈Q〉 and 〈Si 〉 (1 ≤ i ≤ m) without
revealing any private information about the genomic database D
and the query Q . Clearly, by running SEED protocol m times, a
set of exact edit distance 〈di 〉 = SEED(〈Q〉 , 〈Si 〉) (1 ≤ i ≤ m) are
available. Note that 〈di 〉 is in the secret sharing form.
Next, the two servers need to compute the k most similar ge-
nomic sequences depending on the 〈di 〉. During this process, the
values of di and the index i should not be revealed to the servers.
To protect the confidentiality of the index, we adopt shuffle-then-
compare strategy. After the secure shuffling, the link between the
old sequence and the new one can be cut off. To this end, we first
transform the index i to the secret sharing form. Specifically, A
sets 〈i〉A = i while B sets 〈i〉B = 0. Now that A and B hold a
set of key-value pairs [〈i〉 , 〈di 〉](1 ≤ i ≤ m). Next we apply SSF
protocol to these key-value pairs directly, i.e., the same random
integers and permutation functions are applied to the shuffle of 〈i〉
and 〈di 〉 simultaneously, for getting a set of permuted key-value
pairs [〈π (π ′(i))〉 ,
〈
dπ (π ′(i))
〉
](1 ≤ i ≤ m). Note the security of the
permuted key-value pairs is guaranteed by the randomization in
SSF protocol. Similar to SMS protocol, we utilize ADD-CMP circuit
to realize bubble sort for getting the top-k results (correspond-
ing to line 10-13), denoted by [
〈
δj,0
〉
,
〈
δj,1
〉
](1 ≤ j ≤ k). Finally,
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Algorithm 7 Secure Query Protocol in SSQ-I
Input: A inputs 〈Q〉A=[〈Q[1]〉A , · · · , 〈Q[n]〉A] and
〈Si 〉
A=[〈Si [1]〉
A , · · · , 〈Si [n]〉
A](1 ≤ i ≤ m);
B inputs 〈Q〉B=[〈Q[1]〉B , · · · , 〈Q[n]〉B] and
〈Si 〉
B=[〈Si [1]〉
B , · · · , 〈Si [n]〉
B](1 ≤ i ≤ m)
Output: A obtains
〈
Ij
〉A
(1 ≤ j ≤ k);
B obtains
〈
Ij
〉B
(1 ≤ j ≤ k)
1: for 1 ≤ i ≤ m do
2: A and B: 〈di 〉 ← SEED(〈Q〉 , 〈Si 〉)
3: for 1 ≤ i ≤ m do
4: A: 〈i〉A ← i; B: 〈i〉B ← 0
5: A and B:
6: L1 ← [(〈1〉 , 〈d1〉), · · · , (〈m〉 , 〈dm〉)]
7: L2 ← SSF(L1) = [(〈π (π
′(1))〉 ,
〈
dπ (π ′(1))
〉
), · · · ,
(〈π (π ′(m))〉 ,
〈
dπ (π ′(m))
〉
)]
8: for 1 ≤ i ≤ m do
9: A and B:
〈
δi,0
〉
← 〈π (π ′(i))〉 ,
〈
δi,1
〉
←
〈
dπ (π ′(i))
〉
10: for (i = 1; i ≤ k ; i++) do
11: for (j =m; j ≥ i; j– –) do
12: if ADD-CMP(
〈
δj,1
〉
,
〈
δj−1,1
〉
)==0 then
13: A and B: swap(
〈
δj,0
〉
,
〈
δj−1,0
〉
),
swap(
〈
δj,1
〉
,
〈
δj−1,1
〉
)
14: for 1 ≤ j ≤ k do
15: A:
〈
Ij
〉A
←
〈
δj,0
〉A
16: B:
〈
Ij
〉B
←
〈
δj,0
〉B
A outputs the final indices
〈
Ij
〉A
←
〈
δj,0
〉A
while B outputs〈
Ij
〉B
←
〈
δj,0
〉B
(1 ≤ j ≤ k).
5.1.4 Stage 4: Result Recovering. After A and B return
〈
Ij
〉A
and
〈
Ij
〉B
(1 ≤ j ≤ k) to the query user, the user can recover the
index Ij by additions locally. Note that the query user can retrieve
the sequence SIj from two servers by a k-out-of-n OT protocol,
which can prevent the servers from inferring the query results by
monitoring the memory access.
5.2 SSQ-II (with the Approximate Edit
Distance)
The above SEED protocol is an iterative process, which is hard to
boost the performance. In SSQ-II, we leverage the approximate edit
distance computation [3] (described in section 2.1) to improve the
performance of SSQ-I. For brevity, we just present the changed
parts.
5.2.1 Stage 1: Genomic data outsourcing. We assume there are
ω data owners DO1, · · · ,DOw . For DO1, given a set of genomic
sequences D1 = (S1, · · · , Sm1 ), he/she proceeds as follows:
(1) Use BreakToBlocks3 algorithm to break each sequence into t
blocks. For the set D1, DO1 sets the sequence Si = (Si,1, · · · ,
Si,t ) = BreakToBlocks(Si ) for all i = 1, · · · ,m1.
3It is a partition algorithm for genomic data over plaintext, we refer the reader to [3]
for details.
Algorithm 8 Secure Query Protocol in SSQ-II
Input: A and B hold D,T ,L and 〈Q〉
Output: A obtains
〈
Ij
〉A
(1 ≤ j ≤ k);
B obtains
〈
Ij
〉B
(1 ≤ j ≤ k)
1: for Si ∈ D1 do
2: for 1 ≤ l ≤ t1, 1 ≤ j ≤ v1 do
3: A and B:
〈
χl, j
〉
← SAGSC(〈Ql 〉 ,
〈
ul, j
〉
)
4: A and B: 〈di 〉 ←
∑t1
l=1
∑v1
j=1
〈
χl, j
〉
·
〈
ED(ul, j , Si,l )
〉
5: for Si ∈ {D2, · · · ,Dω } do
6: A and B do the same as line 1-4.
7: A and B hold 〈di 〉 (1 ≤ i ≤ m), the remaining steps are the
same as line 3-17 in Algorithm 7.
(2) For each block location l = 1, · · · , t , DO1 gathers the set
T1[l] = {Si,l : i = 1, · · · ,m1} = {ul,1, · · · ,ul,v1 } of all the
possible sequence values for the lth block, where v1 is the
upper bound of the total number of values for each block.
DO1 pads all sets T1[l](1 ≤ l ≤ t) to the same size v1 with
dummy values. DO1 constructs a sequence values set T1, in
which the element T1[l , j] = ul, j (1 ≤ l ≤ t , 1 ≤ j ≤ v1).
(3) For every block location l = 1, · · · , t , every sequence Si , i =
1, · · · ,m1, and every value ul, j ∈ Tl , j = 1, · · · , v1, DO1
computes the exact edit distance between ul, j and Si,l . D1
constructs a distance set L1, in which the element L1[l , j, i] =
ED(ul, j , Si,l )(1 ≤ l ≤ t , 1 ≤ j ≤ v1, 1 ≤ i ≤ m).
After that, DO1 partitions all elements in D1,T1, and L1 using the
genomic sequence secret sharing method shown in Section 5.1.1,
and then uploads them to the servers.
DO2, · · · ,DOw do the same as DO1. Note that we assume all the
sequences are of the same length, and the numbers of partitions
for all sequences are t . After all data owners outsource their data,
A and B aggregate these for maintaining a genomic database D
jointly as follows:
D = (〈D1〉 , · · · , 〈Dw 〉) = (〈S1〉 , · · · , 〈Sm〉),
wherem =
∑ω
i=1mi . In addition, A and B also hold
T = (〈T1〉 , · · · , 〈Tw 〉),L = (〈L1〉 , · · · , 〈Lw 〉).
In this stage, all computations of data owners are a one-time cost,
that is, the elements in D,T ,L could be reused for multiple query
processes.
5.2.2 Stage 2: Query request issuing. The query user breaks the
query sequence Q into t blocks to get Q = (Q1, · · · ,Qt ) by Break-
ToBlocks algorithm, then partitions Q to obtain 〈Q〉 = (〈Q1〉 , · · · ,
〈Qt 〉). After that, the user sends 〈Q〉 to servers.
5.2.3 Stage 3: Secure Query Executing. Recall that χl, j indicates
whether or not ul, j == Ql . When two servers receive the request
from the user, we compute the shares of the indicator bits
〈
χl, j
〉
by
SAGSC protocol. For Si ∈ D1, according to Equation 3, A and B
can easily compute approximate edit distance 〈di 〉 between Q and
Si (1 ≤ i ≤ m1) as follows:
〈di 〉 ≈
t1∑
l=1
v1∑
j=1
〈
χl, j
〉
·
〈
ED(ul, j , Si,l )
〉
,
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where
〈
ED(ul, j , Si,l )
〉
is pre-computed by the data owner and sent
to the servers for store. For Si ∈ {D2, · · · ,Dw }, A and B do the
same. After that, A and B hold 〈di 〉 (1 ≤ i ≤ m), the remaining
steps are the same as that in SSQ-I. We describe this secure query
in Algorithm 8.
5.2.4 Stage 4: Result Recovering. This stage is the same as that
in SSQ-I.
6 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we first analyze the security of the sub-protocols
and our two SSQ protocols, and then present their computational
complexity.
6.1 Security Analysis
The security of secure query protocols in SSQ-I and SSQ-II is assured
by the following theorems:
Theorem 6.1. If SSF, SEED protocols, and ADD-CMP are secure
under the semi-honest adversaries model, then secure query protocol
in SSQ-I is secure under the semi-honest adversaries model.
Theorem 6.2. If SSF, SAGSC protocols and ADD-CMP are secure
under the semi-honest adversaries model, then secure query protocol
in SSQ-II is secure under the semi-honest adversaries model.
In order to prove the above theorems, we first give security
proofs of our sub-protocols including SSF, SBC, SMS, SEED and
SAGSC protocols, and then employ composition theory [15]. The
detailed proofs and discussions can be found in Appendix B.
6.2 Performance Analysis
We analyze the computational complexity of our protocols and
show the analysis results in the Table 2. The detailed analysis can
be found in Appendix C.
Table 2: Computational Complexity of Existing Solutions
and Ours (σ is the statistical security parameter in [26])
Solutions Enc Dec Mul non-XOR gates
SSF/[26] 2n/4n 2n/n n/2n −
SBC/[26] 8/16 8/4 4/8 3/3 + 3σ + 1
SMS/[26] 2n/3n 2n/n n/3n
3(n − 1)/
(3 + 3σ + 1)(n − 1)
SEED 22n1n2 22n1n2 11n1n2 12n1n2
SAGSC − − − 2 − 1
SSQ-I O(mn2) O(mn2) O(mn2) O(m(n2 + k ))
SSQ-II O(n) O(n) O(n) O(m(tv + k ))
7 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our protocols. As
there is no full implementation for secure SSQ on outsourced ge-
nomic data so far, we conduct two sets of experiments: in the first,
we compare our sub-protocols with the state-of-the-art protocols,
and in the second we implement our two SSQ schemes based on
our sub-protocols and report the performance of SSQ-I and SSQ-II.
(a) SSF (b) SBC (c) SMS
?? ?? ?? ?? ???
???
????
????
????
???
???
???
??
?
???????????????????????????
????????
???????
?????
????
(d) SEED (e) SAGSC
Figure 3: The performance of the protocols.
We implemented our protocols in Java, specifically, Paillier cryp-
tosystem with distributed decryption was achieved by BigInteger
Class and Yao’s garbled circuits are constructed by FastGC [18],
which applies the free-XOR technique [24] and oblivious-transfer
extension [20] for optimizations. Our experiments are conducted
on two Amazon EC2 t2.large machines (as serverA andB) running
Ubuntu 16.04, with 8GB of RAM each, and a laptop (as the data
owner and user) running Linux 16.04, with 1.70-GHz Intel i5-3317U
CPU and 4 GB of memory. The communication bandwidth between
the two machines for LAN setting is set to 1 GB/s and the average
network latency is 0.037 ms. In our experiment, we used Homo
SapiensMitochondrion Complete Genome dataset [30] that consists
of 1,046 genomic sequences and the length of each one is 16568.
We report the results for both the offline and online time. The
offline phase includes all computation and communication that
are independent of the input (e.g. The generation of multiplication
triplets, the construction of garbled circuits and offline part in SSF
protocol), while online phase consists of all input-dependent steps.
7.1 Our Protocols vs. Previous Protocols
We compare our protocols with the ones in a previous work [26]
over the real-world dataset. Recall that this work, which focuses on
the secure similarity computation upon trajectory data, achieves
the same functions as part of our protocols with a similar security
level. For a fair comparison, we implement SSF protocol without
data packing technology [6]. We also set public-key security pa-
rameter (i.e., the length of N ) φ = 2048, and the symmetric security
parameter κ = 128 for garbled circuits.
We first compare SSF protocol with the previous protocol in [26]
for varying length of the sequences (i.e., n from 200 to 1000). As
shown in Figure 3(a), the time cost in our protocol and previous pro-
tocol [26] increases linearly with the length of sequences n, which
is consistent with our complexity analysis. There is a little gap
between the offline time in SSF protocol and the time in previous
protocol, but the online time in our protocol has remarkable ad-
vantages, as it does not involve any time-consuming cryptographic
operation.
Figure 3(b) presents the time cost in SBC protocol and the previ-
ous protocol [26] as the bit length of data () increases. The time cost
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in previous protocol and ours grows linearly with , but only small
increases for both. That is, the performance impact of  is limited.
The reason is that  only affects the number of the non-XOR gates
while the single-gate average computing time is very short. We can
also see that the online time cost is quite little. This is because that
SBC protocol mainly calls SSF protocol and ADD-CMP circuit, in
which the online cost is a small portion of the overall cost. We test
the impact of  because it has the effect on the security of SSF proto-
col. To guarantee the security, our goal is to make the masked value
ui + ri (in line 4 of Algorithm 1) distribute in the interval [0,N )
uniformly, and the smaller  would make (N −K · 2)/N decreases,
i.e., make the values distribute more uniformly. In general, given
a fixed N , the smaller  is, the stronger the security is. Because of
this, we set a smaller  = 10 in all other tests.
Figure 3(c) shows the time cost in SMS protocol and the previous
protocol [26] increases at a linear speed as the number of data (n)
increases. For the same reasons explained above, SMS protocol can
also be divided into two phases and the online time is much less
than that in the previous work.
We compare our SEED protocol with the advanced protocol in
[9]. This work presents a homomorphic computation of exact edit
distance based on somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme. In
addition, we also implement another secure exact edit distance
computing protocol using the protocols in [26] as a comparison.
Figure 3(d) shows the time cost for these protocols. When the
length of the sequences n (n1 = n2 = n) increases, the cost of all
protocols grows as O(n2), since exact edit distance computing is
a two-dimension iteration algorithm. Even so, the performance of
SEED protocol still has advantages over the other two. Specially,
SEED has about 50% performance improvement compared with the
protocol in [9]. For example, when n = 50, the online time is 740
seconds in SEED protocol and 1885 seconds in [9].
For SAGSC protocol, Figure 3(e) shows that the online time is
far less than the offline time, since the major operation in SAGSC is
the computation of EQ-ADD circuit and a single circuit runtime is
much less than the circuit construction time. We also observe the
impact of the sequence length (n) to SAGSC protocol is limited. It is
because that the increase of n only increases the number of modular
addition operations, which has a very small impact on the online
time compared with time cost of EQ-ADD circuit computation.
7.2 The Performance of SSQ-I and SSQ-II
In our two schemes, the query executing stage includes the edit
distance computation and top-k results retrieve. We use the SEED
protocol to compute the exact edit distance in SSQ-I. In SSQ-II, an
approximate edit distance computation method is employed for
efficiency. We customize genomic sequences of different length
(n from 10 to 50) based on the real-world data as test dataset and
set block number t from 2 to 10 in SSQ-II, then report single edit
distance computation time for two schemes in Table 3. We only
show the online time in this subsection. Clearly, if the length of
genomic sequences is large, SEED used by SSQ-I generates a large
amount of computing overhead (e.g., it takes 740.3s when n = 50).
Next, we evaluate the performance of SSQ-II in the online phase.
We assume there are 500 genomic sequences with length as 500,
which are outsourced by two data owners and the data size of each
Table 3: The edit distance computation time in SSQ-I and
SSQ-II
n 10 20 30 40 50
SSQ-I 29.6s 118.4s 266.4s 473.6s 740.3s
SSQ-II 1.2s 2.2s 3.4s 4.7s 6.0s
?????????????
???? ???? ???? ???? ????
???????????????????????? ????
(a) n = 500, k = 10 (query)
??
??
?? ???
?
????
????? ? ??
?
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?
?????????????????????
??????????????????
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?? ??? ??? ??? ???
?????????????????????? ????
(b) n = 500,m = 100 (query)
(c) n = 500, k = 10 (comm.) (d) n = 500,m = 100 (comm.)
Figure 4: The performance of SSQ-II protocol.
owner is the same. We test SSQ-II over this dataset with different
scales (m from 100 to 500) while fixing the number of blocks in
each sequence t = 20. Figure 4(a) shows the query time for SSQ-II
as m increases (while fixing k = 10 and k is the number of the
results). The query time grows linearly withm, which coincides
with the theoretical analysis in Section 6.2. We can also conclude
that the time for computing edit distance makes up a greater share
of the total time compared with the time for top-k results retrieve.
For example, it takes 124 minutes for distance computation and
12.5 minutes for top-k computation when m = 500. Figure 4(b)
shows the time cost in SSQ-II increases as k increases (while fixing
m = 100), since there is a positive correlation between the time for
top-k computation and the value of k , although k has no effect on
the time for distance computation. We also collect communication
cost between the two servers during the above tests, similar varying
tendencies are shown in Figure 4(c) and 4(d). The underlying reason
is that the increase of sequence length (m) and the result number
(k) will undoubtedly raise the cost of communication. However, the
communication cost between the client and the servers is negligible,
which is one round including only one query request and k result
indices.
During the query stage, data owners and users needn’t partici-
pate in any computation. During the outsourcing stage, data owners
perform all of the operations in plaintext forms. The data owner
only takes about 3 minutes to create a database in whichm = 500,
n = 500 and t = 20. For arbitrary query users, the task is just
partitioning queries and recovering the secret sharing results by
modular addition operations. This means the overhead to users is
lightweight, which further makes our schemes scalable.
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Table 4: Accuracy of SSQ-II for various choice of k and t
whenm = 500 and n = 500
Number of blocks Number of results Accuracy
t = 10 k = 1/5/10 80%/76%/76%
t = 15 k = 1/5/10 90%/84%/87%
t = 20 k = 1/5/10 100%/94%/92%
t = 25 k = 1/5/10 100%/98%/95%
t = 30 k = 1/5/10 100%/100%/96%
Recall from Section 5.2 that SSQ-II yields approximate results,
computing edit distance through partitioning method and SAGSC
protocol could introduce error. To assess the effects of SAGSC
protocol, we run this protocol multiple times and count the number
of false-positive results. As the SAGSC protocol is used to compare
the sequences in the same location from the sequence values set
Ti with the query block Qi , we collect all sequence values in Ti
from above experiments and then launch pairwise comparison for
these sequences in the same location by SAGSC protocol. We made
a total of 486 comparisons and the number of false-positive results
is 4, the error rate is only about 0.82%. As for the error caused by
partitioning method, we refer the reader to [3] for details.
The accuracy results of SSQ-II are summarized in Table 4. Note
that we do the tests over the above real-world dataset (m = 500,n =
500) and repeat the experiment 10 times for random choice of the
queries. From the table, we find that when the number of blocks is
no fewer than 20, the accuracies of all cases (k = 1, 5, 10) are over
90%. Consider the query performance and accuracy together, so we
set t = 20 whenm = 500,n = 500 in the above experiments.
8 DISCUSSION
8.1 Reducing Error Rate
Here we theoretically analyze how to further reduce the error rate
of SAGSC protocol by a well-designed encoding scheme. Consider
two genomic sequences in which at least one nucleotide’s amount
is different, and for each nucleotide, when the number of its po-
sitions at which the corresponding symbols are different is below
a (a is a integer), we can deterministically detect if the two se-
quences are different by an encoding scheme in a base. For example,
”ATAGCG“ and ”CTACCG“ are represented asx = [0, 3, 0, 2, 1, 2] and
y = [1, 3, 0, 1, 1, 2] under existing encoding scheme, the equation∑6
i=1 xi ==
∑6
i=1 yi holds, it makes a false-positive result when us-
ing SAGSC protocol. If we use a decimal encoding scheme (i.e., a=10,
we use 0, 10, 100, 1000 to represent four nucleotides A,C,G,T), the
same sequences can be denoted as x = [0, 1000, 0, 100, 10, 100] and
y = [10, 1000, 0, 10, 10, 100], and the equation
∑6
i=1 xi ==
∑6
i=1 yi
does not hold, i.e., we can detect the two sequences are different.
8.2 Improving Query Efficiency
In the process of query, we compute edit distances in multiple
datasets uploaded by different data owners. In fact, these datasets
may contain duplicate records, we can decrease the size of genomic
data by deduplication, so the query algorithm is in high efficiency.
In addition, the online query cost can be greatly reduced by parallel
computing, the reason is that the computations of
〈
χl, j
〉
and 〈di 〉
(i.e., Stage 3 in SSQ-II) are independent of others. We consider the
multi-source genomic data fusion and the parallelization of the
query program as a future work.
9 RELATEDWORK
Privacy-preserving query and analysis over genetic data have re-
ceived much attention recently. Existing works [7, 11, 16, 33, 34, 37]
deal with genome variant query, pattern matching, range query,
count query and statistic information computation over genomic
data in a privacy-preserving manner. Secure similar sequence query
on genomic data, which is the focus of our research, is a special case
of secure query processing on genomic data. Secure SSQ on genetic
data is usually considered under two different system models. The
first model is secure multi-party computation setting. The second
model is the secure outsourcing of computation model. We review
the related works under each system model respectively.
9.1 SSQ in Multi-party Computation Model
Jha et al. proposed a privacy-preserving protocol to compute the edit
distance between two genomic sequences based on dynamic pro-
gramming [22]. For performance reasons, the authors showed three
methods to replicate the original edit distance algorithm over Gar-
bled Circuits. Further, Zhu et al. [38] customized a secure garbling
scheme to compute edit distance by leveraging publicly exploitable
traits of target computations, which is significantly more efficient
than traditional garbled circuits. Yet, the computation and the com-
munication overhead of the above schemes are considerable, since
these protocols are all iterative and the number of iterations is the
product of the lengths of two input sequences. To exploit the high
similarity between human genomic sequences, Wang et al. [36] re-
sorted to the approximate edit distance computing. Their scheme is
efficient as the edit distance computation problem is transformed to
the relatively simple set-intersection-size-approximation problem.
Inspired by this approach, a series of query protocols [2, 3] based on
approximate edit distance are proposed. In the most advanced solu-
tion [3], the authors partitioned the sequences into smaller blocks
and then pre-computed the edit distance within the blocks. In this
way, a lot of computational overhead is transferred to a preprocess-
ing stage. These works, however, are all in the SMC model (data is
distributed between two parties who collaboratively compute the
results without revealing to each other their private data), which
are not suitable to our problem since we aim at reducing user-side
overhead to the minimum.
9.2 SSQ in Outsourcing Computation Model
So far there has been no full implementation for secure SSQ on
outsourced genomic data. The following related works focused on
edit distance computation. Atallah and Li [5] initially studied the
secure outsourced protocol for edit-distance sequence comparisons.
Emiliano et al. [10] and Cheon et al. [9] discussed how to calculate
edit distance based on homomorphic encryption (HE). However,
in the above schemes, the exact edit distance is computed in a re-
cursive way, so computational overhead and communication costs
are too large. For example, the scheme in [9] takes 27 seconds to
compute an 8 × 8 block by dynamic programming. A further work
in [23] presented a secure approximate edit distance protocol based
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on the comparison binary circuit in [9]. However, the query user
has a massive overhead. A recent work [27] took a step back to
study secure similar genomic sequence query based on Hamming
distance instead of edit distance. But this simple indicator of simi-
larity is not suitable for genomic data as single-gene insertion or
deletion would have much impact on the similarity. Another simi-
lar work [26] focuses on the similarity computation on encrypted
trajectories data. Compared with it, our mixed protocols achieve
higher performance and support a richer retrieve function. More
importantly, all above works are not scalable in supporting multiple
users and data owners, which is a big gap that our work aims to fill.
10 CONCLUSION
We have presented two novel schemes SSQ-I and SSQ-II towards
secure similar-sequence-query on outsourced genomic data. At
the core of our schemes, we have designed a set of mixed secure
protocols based on secret sharing, garbled circuit, and partial homo-
morphic encryptions to achieve security, efficiency, and scalability
simultaneously. Formal security analysis demonstrated all proto-
cols are secure under the semi-honest adversary model. Finally,
we show the efficacy and efficiency of our solutions through ex-
tensive experiments conducted over a real genomic dataset on a
commercial cloud platform. For the future work, we will continue
to improve SSQ performance over a larger dataset.
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A WAGNER-FISHER ALGORITHM
Algorithm 9 shows how to compute edit distance by Wagner-Fisher
algorithm. The edit distance between two strings X = [a1,a2, . . . ,
an1 ] and Y = [b1,b2, . . . ,bn2 ] is given by dn1,n2 , calculated by the
following recurrence:
di, j =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if i == 0 or j == 0
min
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
di−1, j + cdel
di, j−1 + cins
di−1, j−1 + csub
otherwise
(4)
where cins , cdel , csub correspond to the cost of single-character
insert, delete, and substitute. For the edit distance, cins ← 1, cdel ←
1, csub ← (ai == bj )?0 : 1. It is clear from Equation 4 that the edit
distance calculation is transformed into the process of filling an
(n1 + 1) × (n2 + 1) table with each element di, j . The full dynamic
programming table can be constructed in O(n1n2) time. Once the
table is filled, it is easy to trace on the optimal path. That is, the index
in Algorithm 9 reveals optimal conversion path from an original
sequence to a new one. Figure 5 shows an example of edit distance
computation. The lower-right element d4,5=2 is the final result and
the dotted line represents one of the optimal paths.
? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Figure 5: Example of edit distance computation (The lower-
right element d4,5 = 2 is the final result and the dotted line
represents one of the optimal paths).
Algorithm 9 Edit Distance Computation
Input: X = {a1,a2, . . . ,an1 } and Y = {b1,b2, . . . ,bn2 }
Output: dn1,n2
1: for 0 ≤ i ≤ n1 do
2: di,0 ← i .
3: for 0 ≤ j ≤ n2 do
4: d0, j ← j.
5: cdel ← 1, cins ← 1.
6: for 1 ≤ i ≤ n1,1 ≤ j ≤ n2 do
7: csub ← (ai == bj )?0 : 1.
8: di, j = min(di−1, j + cdel ,di, j−1 + cins ,di−1, j−1 + csub ).
9: return dn1,n2
B THE SECURITY ANALYSIS
Suppose that a two-party protocol P asks A to compute the func-
tion fA(x ,y), and asks B to compute fB(x ,y), where x ,y are the
inputs ofA and B, respectively. The view ofA (resp. B) during an
execution of P on (x ,y), denoted viewA(x ,y) (resp. viewB(x ,y)),
is (x , rA ,m1, · · · ,mt ) (resp. (y, rB ,m1, · · · ,mt )), where rA (resp.
rB ) represents randomness of A (resp. B) andmi represents the
i-th message passed between the parties. Also let OA(x ,y) and
OB(x ,y) denote A’s (resp. B’s) output. We say that protocol P is
secure against semi-honest adversaries if there exist probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT) simulators S1 and S2 such that:
(S1(x , fA(x ,y)), f (x ,y))
c
≡ (viewA(x ,y),O(x ,y)) (5)
(S2(y, fB(x ,y)), f (x ,y))
c
≡ (viewB(x ,y),O(x ,y)) (6)
where
c
≡ denotes computational indistinguishability. More details
can be found in [15].
We assume that the secure computation primitives (described in
Section 2.2) involved in our protocols are secure under semi-honest
model [15], and Paillier cryptosystem with distributed decryption
is semantically secure. The formal security proofs of them can be
found in [4, 17]. In addition, we note that ADD-CMP and EQ-ADD
are direct applications of Yao’s garbled circuits, whose security
proof can be found in [25]. Next, we prove the following theorem
under the above security assumptions.
B.1 Security Analysis of Sub-protocols
We first prove the security of all our sub-protocols. Then we will
employ composition theory to prove that our SSQ-I and SSQ-II are
secure.
Theorem B.1. If Paillier cryptosystem with distributed decryption
(short as PCDD) [17] is semantically secure, then the offline phase
of secure shuffling (short as SSF_off) protocol is secure under the
semi-honest adversaries model.
Proof. The correctness is easy to see, just by inspecting the
output result is shuffled from [−u1 − v1, · · · ,−un − vn ] by the
permutation function π (π ′(·)). Recall that the function of SSF_off
is thatA selects a set of random integersu1, · · · ,un , B selects a set
of random integers v1, · · · ,vn and then B outputs a set of shuffled
values [−uπ (π ′(1)) − vπ (π ′(1)), . . . ,−uπ (π ′(n)) − vπ (π ′(n))]. As for
security, we construct simulators in two distinct cases as SSF_off
protocol is asymmetric for two parties. Case 1: A is corrupted by
an adversary. We construct a simulator S1 to simulate A’s view.
ForA receives L1 = [Epk (uπ ′(1) +vπ ′(1) +rπ ′(1)), . . . , Epk (uπ ′(n) +
vπ ′(n) + rπ ′(n))] from B in the real world, S1 randomly picks a set
of integers α1, · · · ,αn from ZN and encrypts them by PCDD to
get L′1 = [Epk (α1), · · · ,Epk (αn )]. Then, any PPT adversary cannot
distinguish the simulator’s encryption of the random integers (L′1)
from B’s encryption of the correct computation (L1) due to the
semantical security of PCDD. For the output of this protocol in the
real world [−uπ (π ′(1)) − vπ (π ′(1)), . . . ,−uπ (π ′(n)) − vπ (π ′(n))], it is
clearly computational indistinguishable from the output of SSF_off ’
function. In addition, all the values in L1 and the real output are
irrelevant, and all the values in L′1 and the function output are
also irrelevant, so these values are computational indistinguishable.
Therefore, Equation 5 clearly holds. Case 2: B is corrupted by an
adversary. We construct a simulator S2 to simulate the message
sent by A. For B receives L0 = [Epk (u1 + r1), . . . ,Epk (un + rn )]
from A, S2 randomly picks a set of integers β1, · · · , βn from ZN
and encrypts them by PCDD to get L′0 = [Epk (β1), · · · , Epk (βn )].
For B receives L2 from A, S2 randomly picks a set of integers
γ1, · · · ,γn from ZN , then encrypts them by PCDD to get L
′
2. Any
PPT adversary who can distinguish between interaction with A
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(i.e., L0,L2) and interaction with S2 (i.e., L
′
0,L
′
2) can be used to break
the semantical security of PCDD. In addition, all the above values
are selected independently. Thus, no such adversary exists, which
means Equation 6 holds. Putting the above results together, we
can claim that SSF_off is secure under the semi-honest adversary
model. 
TheoremB.2. The online phase of secure shuffling (short as SSF_on)
protocol is secure under the semi-honest adversaries model.
Proof. The proof of Theorem B.2 is similar to that of Theorem
B.1. Due to space limitation, we only describe the outline of our
proof: the function of SSF_on is thatA and B input a secret sharing
sequence 〈x〉, thenA outputs a share of the shuffled sequence 〈x′〉.
The exchanged messages L4 = [〈x1〉
A +u1, . . . , 〈xn〉
A +un ] can be
simulated by randomly choosing L′4 = [β1, · · · , βn ] from Z2 and
L5 = [xπ ′(1) + uπ ′(1) + vπ ′(1), . . . ,xπ ′(n) + uπ ′(n) + vπ ′(n)] can be
simulated by randomly choosing L′5 = [r1, · · · , rn ] from Z2 . So we
can claim that SSF_on is secure under the semi-honest adversaries
model. Please see the technical report [8] for the detailed proof. 
Theorem B.3. If SSF protocol and ADD-CMP are secure under the
semi-honest adversaries model, then SBC protocol is secure under the
semi-honest adversaries model.
Proof. The correctness is easy to see by inspecting the out-
put 〈y〉 is actually assigned according to the relationship between
x1 and x2. As for security, we present the security proof in a hy-
brid model [15] where A and B have access to a trusted party
(TP) which can realize the function of SSF protocol and ADD-
CMP. A and B call TP to run the function of SSF protocol with
input [〈x1〉 , 〈x2〉] for outputting the random permutation result
[
〈
xπ (π ′(1))
〉A
,
〈
xπ (π ′(2))
〉A
] toA and [
〈
xπ (π ′(1))
〉B
,
〈
xπ (π ′(2))
〉B
]
to B. These values are all random according to the function of SSF
protocol, therefore, in the case of a corrupted A, the simulator S1
just chooses two integers α1,α2 from Z2 uniformly at random to
simulate
〈
xπ (π ′(1))
〉A
,
〈
xπ (π ′(2))
〉A
, and in the case of a corrupted
B, the simulator S2 just do the same as S1 to simulate
〈
xπ (π ′(1))
〉B
,〈
xπ (π ′(2))
〉B
uniformly at random. A and B call TP to run the
function of SSF protocol with input [〈y1〉 , 〈y2〉] for outputting the
random permutation result [
〈
yπ (π ′(1))
〉A
,
〈
yπ (π ′(2))
〉A
] to A and
[
〈
yπ (π ′(1))
〉B
,
〈
yπ (π ′(2))
〉B
] to B. Clearly, S1 and S2 can do the
same as above for simulation. A and B call TP to run the function
of ADD-CMP with input
〈
xπ (π ′(1))
〉
,
〈
xπ (π ′(2))
〉
for outputting θ
to A and B. The case in which θ is assigned to 0 or 1 is randomly
given, as π (π ′(·)) is randomly selected. Thus, in the case of a cor-
rupted A or a corrupted B, the simulator just chooses a random
integer from {0, 1} to simulate θ . According to the composition
theory [15], combining the above analysis and the security of SSF
protocol and ADD-CMP, we can claim that SBC protocol is secure
under the semi-honest adversaries model. 
Theorem B.4. If SSF protocol and ADD-CMP are secure under the
semi-honest adversaries model, then SMS protocol is secure under the
semi-honest adversaries model.
Proof. The proof of Theorem B.4 is similar to that of Theorem
B.3. Due to space limitation, we only describe the outline of our
proof. We assume A and B have access to a trusted party (TP)
which can realize the function of SSF protocol and ADD-CMP. The
exchanged messages
〈
xπ (π ′(i))
〉A
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) can be simulated
by randomly choosing the values αi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) at random from
Z2 and θ can be simulated by choosing a random integer from
{0, 1}. So we can claim that SMS protocol is secure under the semi-
honest adversaries model. Please see the technical report [8] for
the detailed proof. 
Theorem B.5. If SBC and SMS protocols are secure under the semi-
honest adversaries model, then SEED protocol is secure under the
semi-honest adversaries model.
Proof. The correctness is easy to see by recover dED from the
output 〈dED 〉 and then inspecting it is actually equal to the edit dis-
tance between x and y. As for security, we present the security proof
in a hybrid model whereA andB have access to a trusted party (TP)
which can realize the function of SBC and SMS protocols. A and B
call TP to run the function of SBC with input 〈t1〉 , 〈xi 〉 , 〈z0〉 , 〈z1〉
for outputting 〈t3〉
A to A and 〈t3〉
B to B. 〈t3〉
A and 〈t3〉
B are
both random according to the function of SBC protocol (the output
is in the secret sharing form), therefore, in the case of a corrupted
A, the simulator S1 just chooses a integers α from Z2l uniformly
at random to simulate 〈t3〉
A . In the case of a corrupted B, the
simulator S2 do the same as S1 to simulate 〈t3〉
B . A and B call TP
to run the function of SBC with input 〈xi 〉 , 〈t2〉 , 〈t3〉 , 〈z1〉. Clearly,
S1 and S2 can do the same as above for simulation. A and B call
TP to run the function of SMS, the outputs of this function
〈
di, j
〉A
and
〈
di, j
〉B
are both random according to the function of SMS
protocol (the output is in the secret-sharing form), therefore, in
the case of a corrupted A or a corrupted B, S1 or S2 can do the
same as above for simulation. According to the composition theory,
combining the above analysis and the security of SBC and SMS
protocols, we can claim that SEED protocol is secure under the
semi-honest adversaries model. 
Theorem B.6. If EQ-ADD is secure under the semi-honest adver-
saries model, then SAGSC protocol is secure under the semi-honest
adversaries model.
Proof. The proof of Theorem B.6 is similar to that of Theorem
B.3. Due to space limitation, we only describe the outline of our
proof.We assumeA andB have access to a trusted party (TP) which
can realize the function of EQ-ADD. The messages 〈χ〉B can be
simulated by choosing a random integer from Z2 . So we can claim
that SAGSC protocol is secure under the semi-honest adversaries
model. Please see the technical report [8] for the detailed proof. 
B.2 Security Analysis of SSQ-I and SSQ-II
Now, we prove Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 6.2 based on the above
theorems.
Proof. (Theorem 6.1) The correctness is easy to see by recover
Ij from the output
〈
Ij
〉
and then inspecting it does actually belong
to the index set of top-k results closed to query. As for security,
we present the security proof in a hybrid model where A and B
have access to a trusted party (TP) which can realize the function
of SSF, SEED protocols and ADD-CMP. A and B call TP to run the
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function of SEED with input 〈Q〉 and 〈Si 〉 for outputting 〈di 〉
A to
A and 〈di 〉
B to B. 〈di 〉
A and 〈di 〉
B are both random according to
the function of SEED protocol (the output is in the secret sharing
form), therefore, in the case of a corrupted A, the simulator S1 just
chooses a integers α from Z2 uniformly at random to simulate
〈di 〉
A . In the case of a corrupted B, the simulator S2 do the same
as S1 to simulate 〈di 〉
B . A and B call TP to run the function of
SSF with input L1 for outputting the random permutation result
〈L2〉
A to A and 〈L2〉
B to B. The values in 〈L2〉
A and 〈L2〉
B are
all random according to the function of SSF protocol, therefore,
in the case of a corrupted A, the simulator S1 just chooses the
values αi (1 ≤ i ≤ 2m) at random from Z2 to simulate the values
in 〈L2〉
A , and in the case of a corrupted B, the simulator S2 just
do the same as S1 to simulate the values in 〈L2〉
B . A and B call
TP to run the function of ADD-CMP with input
〈
δj,1
〉
,
〈
δj−1,1
〉
for outputting the result public to A and B. The case in which the
result is assigned to 0 or 1 is randomly given, as π (π ′(·)) is randomly
selected. Thus, in the case of a corrupted A or a corrupted B, the
simulator just chooses a random integer from {0, 1} to simulate this
result. According to the composition theory, combining the above
analysis and the security of SSF, SEED protocols and ADD-CMP,
we can claim that secure query protocol in SSQ-I is secure under
the semi-honest adversaries model. 
Proof. (Theorem 6.2) Similar to secure query protocol in SSQ-
II, the correctness is easy to see. As for security, we present the
security proof in a hybrid model where A and B have access to a
trusted party (TP) which can realize the function of SSF, SAGSC
protocols and ADD-CMP. A and B call TP to run the function of
SAGSC with input 〈Ql 〉 ,
〈
ul, j
〉
for outputting to
〈
χl, j
〉A
to A and〈
χl, j
〉B
to B. The two values are both random according to the
function of SAGSC protocol, therefore, in the case of a corruptedA
or B, the simulator just chooses a value α at random from Z2 to
simulate
〈
χl, j
〉A
or
〈
χl, j
〉B
. The remaining security proof is same
as that in SSQ-I shown in the proof the Theorem 6.1. 
Next, we demonstrate that SSQ-I can meet the desired privacy
requirements, which is trivially guaranteed by the security of our
protocols. (1) Data privacy: First of all, we recall that data owners
divide the data Si into two shares by additional secret sharing locally
before outsourcing them to the cloud servers. Since the secure query
protocol in SSQ-I is secure under semi-honest adversaries model, no
information is revealed to A and B, data privacy can be preserved.
(2) Query privacy: The query Q is the secret shared by the user
before sending to the cloud servers, and the secure query protocol is
secure under the semi-honest model. Therefore,A and B obtain no
information aboutQ expect the sequence length, the query privacy
is preserved. (3) Hiding data access patterns: In the stage of top-k
result return, the key-value pairs [〈i〉 , 〈di 〉] are in secret sharing
form and permuted by SSF protocol, no one knows
〈
Ij
〉
’ position
in the original database. Therefore, A and B do not know which
data record belongs to the result. Thus, data access patterns are
protected from both A and B. In a similar fashion, we can prove
that the desired privacy properties can be achieved in SSQ-II.
C PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We first analyze the computational complexity of our five sub-
protocols and compare them with existing solutions [26], in which
the protocols are same as part of our protocols with a similar secu-
rity level, and then present the computation complexity of secure
query protocol in SSQ-I and SSQ-II. Refer to performance analysis
in [26], we only consider the expensive cryptographic primitives
including non-XOR gates computation, encryption, decryption, and
multiplication in Paillier cryptosystem. The detailed analysis is as
following:
SSF Protocol: In Algorithm 1, considering the encryptions per-
formed in line 4 and line 10, the decryptions performed in line 16
and line 20 and the multiplications performed in line 10, SSF_offline
totally requires 2n encryptions, 2n decryptions and n multiplica-
tions. In the online phase of SSF protocol, there is no expensive
cryptographic primitive.
SBC Protocol: In Algorithm 3, SSF is used twice to permute
a sequence with two elements in line 2 and line 3, which incurs
8 encryptions, 8 decryptions, and 4 multiplications. In line 4, an
ADD-CMP circuit is used to compare two values. It is important
to note that we apply free-XOR [24] technique for garbled circuits
optimization. Consequently, one ADD circuit contains  non-XOR
gates, one CMP circuit contains  non-XOR gates, so 3 non-XOR
gates computation is required in our approach.
SMS Protocol: Based on the permuted sequence generated by
calling SSF protocol one time, an ADD-CMP circuit executed n −
1 times to get the minimum. Therefore, SMS totally requires 2n
encryptions, 2n decryptions n multiplications, and 3(n − 1) non-
XOR gates.
SEED Protocol: As shown in Algorithm 5, SBC is used twice to
select the branch and SMS is used once to compute minimum at
each iteration and the number of iterations isn1n2. Therefore, SEED
totally requires 22n1n2 encryptions, 22n1n2 decryptions 11n1n2
multiplications, and 12n1n2 non-XOR gates computation.
SAGSC Protocol: As we can see from Algorithm 6, the expen-
sive cryptographic primitive in SAGSC protocol is just an execution
of EQ-ADD circuit. As one EQ circuit contains − 1 non-XOR gates,
only 2 − 1 non-XOR gates computation is required in SAGSC
protocol.
Secure Query Protocol in SSQ-I and SSQ-II: The computa-
tion complexity of secure query protocol in SSQ-I is bounded by
O(m) instantiations of SEED, O(1) instantiations of SSF and O(km)
instantiations of ADD-CMP. Therefore, the total computation com-
plexity is bounded by O(mn2) encryptions, decryptions, multiplica-
tions, and O(m(n2 + k)) non-XOR gates computation. The compu-
tation complexity of Secure Query Protocol in SSQ-II is bounded
by O(mtv) instantiations of SAGSC, O(1) instantiations of SSF, and
O(km) instantiations of ADD-CMP. Therefore, the total compu-
tation complexity is bounded by O(n) encryptions, decryptions,
multiplications, and O(m(tv + k)) non-XOR gates computation.
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